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Euthanasia is a deeply personal and multifaceted topic that has become 
increasingly relevant in contemporary society. New Zealand’s stance on the 
practice of assisted dying was unsuccessfully challenged in Seales v 
Attorney-General. This paper critically evaluates the foundations of that 
decision, applying the R v Hansen majority test for interpreting legislation 
that appears inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The 
right to life bears a broad meaning capable of including a right to die; 
furthermore the rights methodology adopted is out of step with New Zealand 
case law and commentary. The purpose of criminalising assisted suicide is 
attainable through regulating euthanasia, and an alternative reading was, at 
a stretch, tenable. This paper argues that the criminalisation of assisted 
suicide is inconsistent with the right to life, so a declaration of inconsistency 
was an appropriate remedy, if not a strained reading of the Crimes Act 1961 
excluding euthanasia from the scope of suicide. Although lacking in legal 
significance, the decision’s enduring importance lies in provoking 
discussion and potential reform. Future developments in this area will be 
watched with interest; Seales is undoubtedly not the end of the story but 
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In 1965, theologian Leslie Weatherhead wrote:1 
 
I sincerely believe that those who come after us will wonder why on earth we 
kept a human being alive against his own will, when all the dignity, beauty and 
meaning of life had vanished … I, for one, would be willing to give a patient the 
Holy Communion and stay with him while a doctor, whose responsibility I 
should thus share, allowed him to lay down his useless body and pass in dignity 
and peace into the next phase of being. 
 
The law is frequently called upon to grapple with confronting questions of what is right 
and what is wrong. The age-old debate of whether physician-assisted euthanasia should 
be permitted is particularly pertinent in light of technological developments enabling the 
extension of patients’ lives, and a greater recognition of autonomy in contemporary 
medicine. The author is not certain where she stands, nor does this paper seek to take a 
side in the moral debate.  
 
Instead, it aims to discuss the reasoning of Collins J in Seales v Attorney-General, a 
recent New Zealand High Court judgment.2 Ms Seales, a terminally ill Wellington 
lawyer, unsuccessfully sought two sets of declarations, firstly that her doctor would not 
be acting unlawfully in assisting her death and, in the alternative, that the Crimes Act 
(CA) provisions governing murder and assisted suicide were inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights Act (BORA). Seales followed in the footsteps of overseas decisions in which 
individuals argued along similar lines that domestic laws prohibiting euthanasia breached 
their human rights.3 
  
This paper will focus on the alleged inconsistency between the BORA s 8, the right to 
life, and the CA s 179(b), which criminalises “aid[ing] or abet[ting] any person in the 
commission of suicide.” In an article published prior to the decision, Kathryn Tucker and 
Andrew Geddis reasoned that Ms Seales had a “very strong case” in respect of the 
aforementioned inconsistency, and therefore the exclusion of euthanasia from the ambit 
of s 179(b) was a likely outcome.4 The author shared this view, and in consequence this 
  
1 Leslie Weatherhead The Christian Agnostic (Festival Books, Abingdon/Nashville, 1965) at 187. 
2 Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1239. 
3 Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) 2015 SCC 5; Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 230 (HCSA). 
4 Kathryn Tucker and Andrew Geddis “Litigating for the right to die” (2015) 5 NZLJ 172 at 179. 
5  
 
paper will argue it was open to Collins J to find in Ms Seales’ favour. The first section 
will examine Parliament’s intended meaning of suicide, and contend that this meaning is 
inconsistent with the right to life. The second part will undertake a BORA s 5 analysis, 
querying whether that inconsistency is nevertheless justifiable in a free and democratic 
society. Lastly, this paper will acknowledge that a declaration allowing Ms Seales’ 
physician to assist her death may narrow the definition of suicide past what is tenable. 
However, a declaration of inconsistency was feasible and should have been granted. 
 
Although Seales has brought the issue of euthanasia into the public forum for debate and 
possible legislative reform in New Zealand, the result is disappointing and does not push 
the boundaries with regards to human rights recognition. A declaration of inconsistency 
would have sent a strong message to Parliament that the current situation infringes 
unreasonably upon citizens’ rights. 
 
II Physician-assisted euthanasia 
 
Euthanasia is a Greek term meaning ‘good death.’5 It refers to several strands of assisted 
dying that are believed to offer a merciful and peaceful end to a patient’s suffering. Non-
voluntary euthanasia encompasses situations where a patient is medically incompetent 
and the choice to end their life is made by a third party.6 At the other end of the spectrum 
lies voluntary euthanasia, where a patient themselves requests death. The law draws a 
distinction within this category between active euthanasia, where positive steps are taken 
to bring about death, and passive euthanasia, where the patient’s death is due to an 
omission.7 In most jurisdictions where assisted death is prohibited, passive euthanasia is 
legally permissible.8 Ms Seales sought her physician’s assistance to take positive steps to 








5 Stuart Beresford “Euthanasia: The Right to Die and the Bill of Rights Act” [2005] HRR 3: 2 
<www.vuw.ac.nz\nzcpl\>.  
6 Beresford, above n 5, at 5.  
7 Beresford, above n 5, at 5. 
8 Beresford, above n 5, at 8. 
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III Reviewing Seales 
 
This paper will apply the process set out by the majority in R v Hansen:9 
 
Step 1. Ascertain Parliament’s intended meaning. 
Step 2. Ascertain whether that meaning is apparently inconsistent with a relevant 
right or freedom. 
Step 3. If apparent inconsistency is found at step 2, ascertain whether that 
inconsistency is nevertheless a justified limit in terms of s 5. 
Step 4. If the inconsistency is a justified limit, the apparent inconsistency at step 2 is 
legitimised and Parliament’s intended meaning prevails. 
Step 5. If Parliament’s intended meaning represents an unjustified limit under s 5, 
the Court must examine the words in question again under s 6, to see if it is 
reasonably possible for a meaning consistent or less inconsistent with the relevant 
right or freedom to be found in them. If so, that meaning must be adopted. 
Step 6. If it is not reasonably possible to find a consistent or less inconsistent 
meaning, s 4 mandates that Parliament’s intended meaning be adopted. 
A Parliament’s intended meaning 
The first step of the Hansen test requires the ascertainment of the meaning Parliament 
intended to attribute to suicide in the CA.  
 
In determining this, Collins J looked to the origins of New Zealand’s criminal legislation. 
His Honour affirmed Sir James Stephen’s conclusion that suicide occurs when “a man 
kills himself intentionally.”10 Stephen drafted the Criminal Code Act 1893, which forms 
the basis of New Zealand’s current CA, the most relevant amendment being the 
decriminalisation of attempted suicide in 1961 for policy reasons.11 Counsel for Ms 
Seales contended that the CA legislative changes relating to suicide displayed a shift in 
parliamentary intent from preserving the sanctity of life to actively upholding 
autonomy.12 Although the provisions may be read consistently with an exclusion of 
  
9 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [92] per Tipping J. This approach is generally accepted 
in New Zealand as the appropriate application of ss 4, 5 and 6. Other tests have also been proposed, notably 
Elias CJ in the minority in Hansen and Tipping J in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 
2 NZLR 9. The question as to which should be applied is beyond the scope of this paper. The Hansen 
majority test gives due deference to parliamentary sovereignty and is tailored for situations where there are 
two contended meanings, as in this case. 
10 Seales, above n 2, at [87] and [117]. 
11 Seales, above n 2, at [129]. 
12 At [127]. 
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euthanasia from suicide, it is highly unlikely Parliament intended to do so. Collins J’s 
conclusion that Parliament intended suicide to bear a broad meaning – intentionally 
taking one’s own life – accords with socio-political attitudes towards end of life 
decisions, which were far less accepting of euthanasia fifty years ago. 
B Inconsistency with the right to life 
Step two of Hansen asks whether Parliament’s intended meaning is inconsistent with the 
relevant right. Collins J answered this in the negative, however this paper asserts that 
criminalising assisted euthanasia does infringe upon the right to life. Before any potential 
curtailment of the right can be identified, the right to life itself must be defined. The 
following section will canvass orthodox and contemporary conceptions of the right to life 
and argue for the inclusion of a right to die within the BORA s 8, which states “no one 
shall be deprived of life except on such grounds as are established by law and are 
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.”  
1 Scope of the right 
Determining whether Parliament’s intended meaning of suicide is inconsistent with s 8 
first requires an exploration of how the right should be construed. Various courts and 
academics have imbued the right to life with a range of meanings. Bernard McCloskey 
aptly describes the codification of this right in human rights instruments as “deceptively 
simple.”13 The law does not expressly recognise a right to die, therefore such a right must 
be found to exist within an established right in order to be upheld.14 Whether a right to 
die with dignity, or a right to choose the time and circumstances of one’s death, can be 
read into the right to life is fiercely contested in classical and contemporary scholarship. 
As John Coggon notes, the law is “fragile” in this area.15  
 
The right to life is uniquely important as “the source of all other fundamental rights.”16 
Without it, an individual cannot access other rights. It may therefore appear contradictory 
to propose that the right to life contains the right to end one’s life. There is a further 
oddity at play – the inevitability of death. Scott Shershow acknowledges that death 
“marks the limit of all rights and all freedom,” and questions whether it is tenable to have 
  
13 Bernard McCloskey “The right to life – human rights at birth and death” (2011) 37 CLB 219 at 224. 
14 Margaret Otlowski Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) 
at 196. 
15 John Coggon “Could the right to die with dignity represent a new right to die in English law?” (2006) 14 
Med L Rev 219 at 231. 
16 Nicolae Pavel “The Right to Life as a Supreme Value and Guaranteeing the Right to Life” (2012) 4 
Contemp Readings L & Soc Just 970 at 972.  
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a right to “that which comes inescapably to all.”17 However, the existence of a right to die 
is not as far-fetched as it may seem. Technology’s increasing ability to prolong death has 
prompted the law to adapt to reflect social and moral values. Individuals are already able 
to exercise control, albeit limited, over the manner in which they die. The BORA protects 
the right to refuse medical treatment,18 and the law upholds valid advance directives,19 
colloquially known as ‘living wills.’ The boundaries between life and death have shifted, 
leading to widespread recognition that “while death may be the end of life, dying is a part 
of life and, therefore, how an individual dies is a vital aspect of how that individual has 
lived his or her life.”20 In this contemporary outlook, life and death are viewed not as 
opposites, but as forces that overlap and are inextricably bound. Opponents of legalising 
euthanasia often argue that the recognition of a right to die would give rise to a 
corresponding duty to assist. However, as with abortion, the right to end life should be 
defined as a right to authorise assistance, rather than demand it.21  
 
Underlying the ethical and legal discussion of the scope of the right to life is a perceived 
clash of values between the sanctity of life, individual autonomy and dignity. The sanctity 
of life principle stems from religious and natural beliefs that all life is sacred and belongs 
to a higher power.22 It lies at the heart of modern society and places the utmost 
importance on the protection of life, which explains humankind’s instinctive aversion to 
murder and suicide. Sanctity of life is most clearly upheld in case law interpreting the 
reach of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, which stress the “fundamental nature 
of the right to life.”23 
 
In Pretty v The United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights rejected an 
application for assisted euthanasia. The Court narrowly defined the right to life, and 
firmly rejected Mrs Pretty’s submission that the provision “protected not only the right to 
  
17 Scott Shershow “The Sacred Part: Deconstruction and the Right to Die” (2012) 12 CR–New Centen Rev 
153 at 155. 
18 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 11. 
19 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Service Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulations 1996, sch 1, cl 2, right 7(5). 
20 Elizabeth Wicks “The Meaning of ‘Life’: Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human Rights 
Treaties” (2012) 12 HRLR 199 at 214. 
21 Otlowski, above n 14, at 201–202. 
22 Sheila McLean Assisted Dying: Reflections on the Need for Law Reform (Routledge-Cavendish, Oxon, 
2007) at 28–29. 
23 Wicks, above n 20, at 201. 
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life but also the right to choose whether or not to go on living.”24 Central to the Court’s 
reasoning was the distinction between freedoms and the right to life, the former 
conferring both positive and negative abilities and the latter only guaranteeing a positive 
right to act.25 Pretty is strong authority for the proposition that “Article 2 cannot, without 
a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, 
namely a right to die.”26 However, this construction of the right to life is somewhat 
tempered by the Court’s treatment of Article 8, which protects an individual’s “right to 
respect for his private and family life.”27 The Court noted quality of life issues will be 
meaningful in the context of Article 8, but cautioned that this should not undermine the 
significance of the sanctity of life.28 The Court was “not prepared to exclude” the notion 
of inconsistency with Article 8 in these circumstances,29 which further widened the scope 
for discussion of assisted euthanasia. Disappointingly, the Court sidestepped a decision 
on this point, concluding any inconsistency would be nonetheless justified.30  
 
Subsequent cases have confirmed Pretty’s tentative conclusion, exhibiting a “general 
reluctance” to push the boundaries of the meaning of Article 231 and developing a 
dialogue around the quality of life within Article 8.32 Despite Pretty’s reinforcement of 
the supremacy of the sanctity of life, the courts have indicated a willingness to read the 
two provisions together. Most recently, in Lambert and Others v France, family members 
of a tetraplegic man in a chronic vegetative state challenged his doctors’ plan to withdraw 
artificial sustenance.33 The majority held the applicants lacked standing to complain on 
Mr Lambert’s behalf,34 but went on to consider the alleged breach of Article 2. Although 
Lambert pertains to non-voluntary euthanasia, the case contains relevant discussion of the 
  
24 Pretty v The United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 (Section IV, ECHR) at [35]. 
25 At [39]. 
26 At [39]. 
27 European Convention on Human Rights 213 UNTS 221 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered 
into force 3 September 1953), art 8. 
28 Pretty, above n 25, at [65]. 
29 At [67]. 
30 At [78]. 
31 Shawn Harmona and Nayha Sethib “Preserving Life and Facilitating Death: What Role for Government 
after Haas v Switzerland?” (2011) 18 Eur J Health L 355 at 363. 
32 See generally Haas v Switzerland (2011) 53 EHRR 33 (Section I, ECHR); R (Purdy) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 AC 345; R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v 
Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 AC 657; Koch v Germany (2012) 56 EHRR 6 (Section V, 
ECHR); Gross v Switzerland [2014] ECHR 1008 (Grand Chamber, ECHR). 
33 Lambert and Others v France (46043/14) Grand Chamber, ECHR 5 June 2015 at [80]. 
34 At [105]. 
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scope of the right to life. The majority directed that in cases concerning euthanasia 
Article 2 should be considered alongside Article 8, in particular “the right to respect for 
private life and the notion of personal autonomy which it encompasses.”35 
Notwithstanding the strong tenor of the Pretty judgment, recent case law has created 
room for a broader interpretation of the right to life.  
 
Autonomy and dignity have traditionally been viewed in opposition to the sanctity of life. 
Individuals seeking euthanasia commonly cite the loss of autonomy and dignity as their 
main reasons for wishing to die, as evidenced by surveys carried out in jurisdictions 
where euthanasia is legal.36 Autonomy is an individual’s right to self-determination to the 
extent that their actions do not harm the rights of others.37 Dignity encompasses both 
objective and subjective perceptions of an individual’s quality of life.38 If an individual’s 
suffering is such that they believe their life is undignified, autonomy mandates that 
ending their life is their decision to make. Prima facie this clashes with the sanctity of 
life, which upholds life over all else. 
 
It is possible to marry these concepts together in a manner that better accords with 
modern understandings of human rights. To Ronald Dworkin, what is important is not 
whether the sanctity of life trumps other rights, but how the sanctity of life can be 
“understood and respected.”39 Dignity and autonomy form a crucial part of the foundation 
of human rights instruments, many of which were enacted in response to atrocities 
committed during wartime.40 They are therefore believed to shape all human rights. 
Interpreting the right to life thus requires the sanctity and quality of life to be read 
together, drawing a distinction between life that is merely biological and life that is truly 
valued. Emily Jackson alludes to this, noting the “important difference between simply 
being alive and having a life which is worth living.”41 The quality of life approach 
  
35 At [142]. 
36 Emily Jackson “In favour of the Legalization of Assisted Dying” in Emily Jackson and John Keown (eds) 
Debating Euthanasia (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 1 at 9. 
37 Constance Putnam “What kind of a right is the right to die?” (2009) 4 EJMH 165 at 171. 
38 Coggon, above n 15, at 228; Paul Tiensuu “Whose Right to What Life? Assisted Suicide and the Right to 
Life as a Fundamental Right” (2015) 15 HRLR 251 at 267. 
39 Ronald Dworkin Life’s Dominion: an argument about abortion and euthanasia (HarperCollins 
Publishers, London, 1995) at 217. 
40 Wicks, above n 20, at 206. 
41 Jackson, above n 36, at 42. 
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dominated the reasoning of recent euthanasia cases Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) 
and Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice.42 
 
Carter concerned whether s 241(b) of the Criminal Code, which criminalises assisted 
suicide,43 unjustifiably violated the right to life, liberty and security of the person.44 In a 
per curiam judgment, the Canadian Supreme Court found for the appellants, striking 
down s 241(b).45 The Court approved the trial judge’s conclusion that the right to life was 
engaged because affected individuals face the choice of committing suicide at an early 
stage or risking their condition deteriorating to a point where they are suffering and 
physically unable to end their lives.46 The Court reinforced the centrality of the sanctity 
of life to the right to life, and observed that the right includes “life, liberty and security of 
the person during the passage to death.”47 Autonomy and dignity were held to underpin 
an individual’s rights to liberty and security of the person,48 and the Court expanded upon 
the implications of this in the context of euthanasia. The law’s refusal to allow terminally 
ill patients to request euthanasia hinders their liberty by limiting the options available to 
them at the end of their lives, and threatens their security by forcing them to undergo 
painful and undignified suffering.49 The Court neatly encapsulated the codependence of 
the sanctity and quality of life, stating that “s 7 recognises the value of life, but it also 
honours the role that autonomy and dignity play at the end of that life.”50  
 
Fabricius J in the South African High Court took this construction of the right to life a 
step further, explicitly recognising a right to die with dignity in Stransham-Ford. The 
South African judicial landscape is somewhat different in that courts must develop the 
common law if a statute does not uphold the Bill of Rights.51 The Bill of Rights protects 
the dignity of all people,52 and upholds the right to freedom and security of the person, 
which includes security in and control over the body.53 The South African Constitution 
  
42 Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) 2015 SCC 5; Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and 
Correctional Services and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 230 (HCSA). 
43 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s 241(b). 
44 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), s 7. 
45 Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) 2015 SCC 5 at [147]. 
46 At [57]–[58]. 
47 At [63].  
48 At [64]. 
49 At [66]. 
50 At [68]. 
51 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, ch 2, s 39(2)(a). 
52 Chapter 2, s 10. 
53 Chapter 2, s 12(2)(b). 
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emphasises the nation’s foundations of dignity, equality and freedom.54 In his discussion 
of dignity’s place in the law, Fabricius J approved the reasoning of O’Reagan J in S v 
Makwanyane:55 
 
It is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but the right 
to human life: the right to share in the experience of humanity. This concept of 
human life is at the centre of our constitutional values. The Constitution seeks to 
establish a society where the individual value of each member of the community 
is recognised and treasured. The right to life is central to such a society. The 
right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to 
dignity and to life are intertwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a 
right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is 
substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be dignity. 
 
In support of this contention, Fabricius J also positively referenced United States 
Supreme Court judgment Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, which 
concluded that “dying is part of life, it is completion rather than its opposite.”56 His 
Honour’s decision was also informed by Carter, which was a particularly useful 
comparison given the similarities between the jurisdictions’ human rights instruments.57 
The South African rights-based background as well as an examination of the relevant 
authorities led Fabricius J to remark that weight should be placed upon “the sacredness of 
the quality of life” rather than “the sacredness of life per se.”58 Reaching this conclusion 
enabled the Judge to interpret the right to life broadly, including the right to die. His 
Honour considered that the right to life obliges the state to protect life but does not “mean 
that an individual is obliged to live, no matter what the quality of his life is.”59 
 
The New Zealand BORA does not contain direct reference to dignity and autonomy. It 
has no equivalent to Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, or ss 10 and 
12 of the South African Bill of Rights, nor does it mention liberty and security of the 
person alongside the right to life as s 7 of the Canadian Charter does. New Zealand’s 
human rights framework can therefore be distinguished from other nations in which 
  
54 Chapter 1, s 1(a). 
55 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), cited in Stransham-
Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 230 (HCSA) at [12]. 
56 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 US 261 (1990) at 343, cited in Stransham-Ford, 
above n 55, at [14]. 
57 Stransham-Ford, above n 55, at [18]. 
58 At [14]. 
59 At [23]. 
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euthanasia cases have arisen, however the same reasoning should still apply because 
dignity and autonomy inform an understanding of all human rights. Furthermore, the 
negative framing of s 8 should not preclude a wide reading of the right. It is generally 
accepted that the right to life confers both positive and negative obligations, thus states 
owe a duty to abstain from killing and to actively preserve life.60 It is therefore not 
inconceivable for “no one shall be deprived of life” to be construed in a positive manner 
that enables individuals to assert their right to dignified death. 
 
Collins J defines the right to life conservatively in Seales. There was apparent scope to 
include a right to die within the right to life, a reading that has garnered support in 
contemporary scholarship and recent overseas decisions. Carter is especially persuasive 
because the BORA was modeled on the Charter.61 Collins J sets out the key principles 
underlying Ms Seales’ claim, notably the sanctity of life, dignity and autonomy. His 
Honour discusses the importance of the sanctity of life, and notes it may be subservient to 
other interests in certain circumstances.62 His Honour defines dignity and autonomy, and 
quotes passages from Stransham-Ford and Carter linking these values to the right to 
life.63 It is disappointing that Collins J’s analysis ends there, without discussing how the 
right to life should be understood in New Zealand, nor how dignity and autonomy fit into 
the equation. 
 
Collins J later acknowledges the similarity between Ms Seales’ claim and that of the 
appellants in Carter,64 and rightly cautions that s 7 of the Charter is wider than its New 
Zealand counterpart.65 His Honour does accept that s 8 is engaged in Ms Seales’ situation 
on the same grounds as in Carter.66 In all other matters, Collins J differs from the 
Canadian Supreme Court regarding the alleged inconsistency. Regrettably, the 
methodology employed by Collins J in Seales restricts the scope of the right to life at the 
second step of the Hansen analysis – inquiring whether there is an inconsistency. It would 
have been more appropriate to consider the limitations within the right at the next stage, 
asking whether such an inconsistency is justified. 
  
60 Wicks, above n 20, at 202. See also Lambert and Others v France (46043/14) Grand Chamber, ECHR 5 
June 2015 at [117]. 
61 Tucker and Geddis, above n 4, at 176. 
62 Seales, above n 2, at [63]–[65]. 
63 At [66], [70] and [75]. 
64 At [162]. 
65 At [155]–[158]. 
66 At [166]. 
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2 Rights methodology 
The right to life is not absolute; it is subject to lawful exceptions that accord with the 
principles of fundamental justice.67 Section 8 therefore contains a limitation within the 
right itself. Section 7 of the Charter is similarly structured. It is therefore unsurprising 
that Collins J’s analysis of the conflict between the BORA s 8 and the CA s 179(b) 
mirrors the Court’s discussion in Carter. 
  
Petra Butler recommends that a BORA s 5 analysis should not be the starting point for 
interpreting a limited right; instead one must acknowledge that rights are fundamental 
because they are at the core of what it means to be human.68 As a result, their scope must 
be defined as widely as possible.69 She argues that qualifying phrases in rights provisions 
must not be interpreted within the rights themselves, because this would amount to 
“advanced and/or disguised s 5 scrutinies.”70 Although Parliament’s clear intention is to 
limit the scope of the right, the BORA bestows upon the courts a responsibility to protect 
individual rights.71 This responsibility is best achieved by adopting a methodology that 
casts the reach of the right broadly when judging its compatibility with the statutory 
provision at issue.72 The limitation should only be examined during a s 5 analysis, at 
which time it is appropriate to defer to parliamentary sovereignty by balancing the rights 
of the individual with those of the democratic majority.73 Taking this approach avoids 
improperly restricting human rights whilst recognising Parliament’s prerogative to 
override rights where reasonably necessary. The Supreme Court has begun to follow this 
approach, but has not yet expressly provided guidance on the matter.74 
 
The Court of Appeal has approved a rights methodology that defines the scope widely 
and considers in-built limitations within s 5. In Quilter v Attorney-General, Tipping J 
advised that “it is better conceptually to start with a more widely defined right and 
legitimise or justify a restriction if appropriate, than to start with a more restricted 
right.”75 Tipping J’s guidance has been reinforced by subsequent judgments, most 
  
67 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 8. 
68 Petra Butler “Bill of Rights” in Mary-Rose Russell and Matthew Barber (eds) The Supreme Court of New 
Zealand 2004-2013 (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2015) 255 at 266. 
69 At 266. 
70 At 266. 
71 At 267. 
72 At 267. 
73 At 267. 
74 Butler, above n 68, at 274. 
75 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) at 576. 
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recently in Ministry of Health v Atkinson.76 In Atkinson, the Court of Appeal declined to 
follow the Canadian rights methodology approach, approving the Tribunal’s suggestion 
that New Zealand should develop its own jurisprudence in light of our unique legislative 
and constitutional makeup.77 The Court affirmed that “matters of justification” should not 
be brought to bear upon the definition of the right itself but rather remain within the 
confines of s 5.78 The Canadian Charter is supreme law, therefore the consequences of an 
unjustified breach are more severe than in New Zealand, where inconsistent statutes 
cannot be struck down.79 
 
In Carter, the Court essentially carried out two justified limitation discussions, one 
surrounding the principles of fundamental justice within the right to life, and one 
considering whether a prohibition of assisted euthanasia could be justified by wider social 
concerns. Although this is the accepted practice in Canada, the author ventures that 
undertaking the same analysis twice is impractical and lends itself to the strict approach 
Butler cautions against. It was inappropriate for Collins J to follow Carter, given New 
Zealand’s stance on rights methodology. His Honour should have defined the right to life 
broadly, and examined the principles of fundamental justice during the justification stage 
of the Hansen test. A generous interpretation of the BORA upholds New Zealand human 
rights jurisprudence, furthermore the wording of s 8 expressly characterises the principles 
of fundamental justice as a condition of the right. Adopting this methodology would have 
corresponded with previous New Zealand dicta, and given Ms Seales’ claim a stronger 
chance of success.  
 
In Seales, Collins J does not interpret the right to life in accordance with the accepted 
New Zealand methodology. His Honour includes the right’s limitation within its scope by 
breaking s 8 into three components – the right to life, lawful exceptions, and consistency 
with the principles of fundamental justice.80 His Honour does not discuss the right to life 
in a broad, human rights friendly setting but instead allows the qualified definition to 
guide his analysis of compatibility with the principles of fundamental justice.81 These had 
not previously been examined in New Zealand, so Collins J looked to Canadian case 
  
76 Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456 at [101]. 
77 Atkinson, above n 76, at [109]–[110]; Atkinson v Ministry of Health [2010] NZHRRT 1, (2010) HRNZ 
902 at [187]. 
78 At [128]. 
79 Atkinson, above n 76, at [118]. 
80 Seales, above n 2, at [152]. 
81 It is arguable that Collins J’s reasoning in Part III of the judgment was coloured by his Honour’s finding 
that the CA provisions could not accommodate euthanasia in Part II. 
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law.82 The principles – arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality – bear 
meanings equivalent to the limbs of a BORA s 5 analysis. As a result, applying the 
principles of fundamental justice within the scope of the right to life makes little sense. 
 
In both jurisdictions it is for the plaintiff to prove a human rights breach.83 In 
incorporating what is in substance a s 5 analysis into the right to life, Collins J renders it 
extremely difficult for Ms Seales, or any plaintiff for that matter, to satisfy this onus. His 
Honour’s methodology places Ms Seales in the position envisaged by Butler – being 
required to bring evidence that the inconsistency between s 8 and s 179(b) is unjustified.84 
This outcome runs contrary to the plaintiff’s usual position in a s 5 analysis, where the 
burden rests with the state to justify their breach of a human right. Placing the onus of 
proof on the state at this stage is appropriate. The state enacted the law in question and 
therefore is best placed to deliver evidence validating its necessity. Collins J effectively 
made it impossible for Ms Seales’ claim to succeed by forcing her to advocate within the 
scope of the right to life that the limitation on her rights was unjustified. His Honour’s 
methodology is not human rights friendly because it makes proving inconsistency far 
more challenging for plaintiffs. Seales takes a disappointingly conservative approach that 
fits poorly with New Zealand’s contemporary stance on human rights litigation. 
 
If Collins J had followed the rights methodology argued for above, the right to life could 
have been construed as including the right to die. A finding of inconsistency at the second 
stage of the Hansen test would have been likely, as preventing individuals from 
determining the circumstances of their death could then be said to contradict their rights 
under s 8. Collins J’s analysis in Seales was unfortunate in this regard, as a finding of 
consistency meant none of the remedies sought by Ms Seales were available. 
C Justified inconsistency 
This paper will now consider the remaining limbs of the Hansen analysis, and explore the 
options available to the Court in Seales. Steps three and four require a discussion of 
whether the aforementioned inconsistency is a justified limitation per s 5 of the BORA. If 
satisfied, Parliament’s intended meaning must be applied. Hansen sets out the test for 
determining whether a limitation is justified. The test is derived from Canadian case law, 
creating another similarity between the two jurisdictions in this area:85 
  
82 At [169]. 
83 Seales, above n 2, at [174]; Butler, above n 68, at 274. 
84 Butler, above n 68, at 274. 
85 R v Hansen, above n 9, at [104] per Tipping J. 
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(a) does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right or freedom? 
(b)  
(i) is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose? 
(ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is 
reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
(iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?  
1 Purpose 
Firstly, the purpose of the provision at issue must be ascertained. It must then be 
determined whether that aim is significant enough to validate limiting a right protected by 
the BORA. 
 
Collins J adopted the wide purpose of s 179(b) advocated for by the state, the “absolute 
protection of the lives of all who are vulnerable” and the protection of the lives of those 
who are not vulnerable, “so far as is reasonably possible.”86 In Carter, the Court opted for 
a narrower formulation, namely “preventing vulnerable persons from being induced to 
commit suicide at a time of weakness.”87 Selecting this narrow purpose enabled a finding 
of inconsistency on the basis that prohibiting physician-assisted euthanasia is overly 
broad.88 A blanket ban on assisted euthanasia went further than necessary to achieve the 
protection of vulnerable people. Only some people wishing to avail themselves of 
euthanasia can be classed as vulnerable, while others are of sound mind and make a 
voluntary and fully informed choice to end their lives.89 In assessing the principles of 
fundamental justice against such a broad purpose, Collins J failed to heed the Court’s 
warning in Carter that doing so would render the outcome inevitable.90  
 
In Seales, Collins J explained the necessity of a broad purpose by asserting that New 
Zealand and Canada have a “different legislative framework” for criminal offences.91 
There are no significant differences between suicide provisions in New Zealand and 
Canada. Both nations’ criminal legislation originated from Stephen’s Code, which was 
drafted in England but only implemented elsewhere.92 New Zealand does have a 
  
86 Seales, above n 2, at [132]. 
87 Carter, above n 45, at [78]. 
88 At [86]. 
89 At [86]. 
90 At [77]. 
91 Seales, above n 2, at [186]. 
92 At [87]. 
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provision enabling the use of necessary force to prevent suicide,93 which Collins J relies 
upon to distinguish between New Zealand and Canada.94 Geddis notes that the validity of 
this reasoning is questionable.95 Although Canada has no such statutory defence, the 
Criminal Code facilitates the continuation of common law criminal defences.96 In 
practice, Canada’s necessity defence operates in the same way as s 41; hence the statutory 
context of these two jurisdictions with respect to assisted suicide is not materially 
different.97  
 
Furthermore, Canada has no provision criminalising suicide pacts. In Canada, the 
survivor of a suicide pact may be charged with murder or assisted suicide,98 whereas in 
New Zealand s 180 reduces a survivor’s potential liability to manslaughter or being party 
to a suicide pact, which carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment.99 
According to Geddis, the Canadian government has taken a harder line against suicide 
pacts, and in this sense focuses more on protecting life than New Zealand does.100 Again, 
a comparison of the two jurisdictions reinforces the conclusion that Collins J should not 
have construed the purpose of s 179(b) more broadly than in Carter. 
 
It would therefore have been more appropriate for Collins J to ascribe a narrow purpose 
to s 179(b), given the similarities between Canadian and New Zealand criminal law. The 
narrow and wide purposes both seek to protect life, regardless of whether this is restricted 
to vulnerable classes or extended across society. Whichever purpose is preferred, both are 
compelling enough to justify infringing the right to life. 
2 Rational connection 
The limitation upon the right may still be ruled unjustified if it does not satisfy the second 
stage of the Hansen s 5 analysis. It must first be ascertained whether this restriction is 
rationally connected with its aim. 
 
  
93 Crimes Act 1961, s 41. 
94 At [123]. 
95 Andrew Geddis “Where to next for aid in dying?” (9 June 2015) Pundit <www.pundit.co.nz>. This blog 
entry was posted several days after the judgment was released. 
96 Section 8(3). 
97 Geddis, above n 95. 
98 Sections 222, 229, and 241(b). 
99 Crimes Act, s 180. 
100 Geddis, above n 95. 
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In Carter, the Court held there was a rational connection between prohibiting assisted 
euthanasia and protecting vulnerable individuals.101 Collins J came to the same 
conclusion through his analysis of the principles of fundamental justice, finding the 
provision did not operate arbitrarily in achieving its purpose of protecting vulnerable and, 
as far as possible, non-vulnerable individuals.102 Whichever purpose is accepted, this 
ground is easily satisfied because s 179(b) imposes a blanket ban and therefore applies 
broadly to all citizens.  
3 Minimal impairment 
The next limb requires determining whether the limitation infringes the right only as far 
as reasonably necessary to achieve its goal. The following section will argue that the 
protection of vulnerable individuals can be accomplished under a system that regulates 
physician-assisted euthanasia, and, as a result, the current criminalisation of euthanasia 
goes further than required. 
 
Collins J held s 179(b) did not overreach the broad purpose of protecting life. If his 
Honour had based this inquiry on the narrower purpose contended for by Ms Seales, the 
result might well have differed. Carter turned on the Court’s finding that criminalising 
assisted euthanasia impinges upon citizens’ rights more than reasonably necessary to 
protect vulnerable individuals.103 The Court stated that blocking all access to euthanasia 
goes beyond merely protecting vulnerable individuals from harm, by stopping rational 
adults from exercising their right to life.104 The provision therefore governs behaviour 
falling outside its purpose. Fabricius J endorsed this in Stransham-Ford, observing most 
euthanasia cases before the courts “would not be connected to the objective of protecting 
vulnerable persons at all.”105 These recent judgments are persuasive authority that 
banning euthanasia goes further than required to protect vulnerable people. There is no 
material reason why this analysis should not apply in the New Zealand context, 
presuming the purpose of s 179(b) can be achieved through the regulation of physician-
assisted euthanasia. If preventing exploitation cannot be maintained through legalising 
euthanasia, a blanket ban is the only appropriate recourse. 
 
  
101 At [101]. 
102 Seales, above n 2, at [180]. 
103 At [121]. 
104 At [86]. 
105 At [18]. 
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A major concern around permitting euthanasia is that vulnerable people, such as those 
who are elderly, disabled or ill, may feel pressured to end their lives to avoid burdening 
loved ones and the healthcare system. However, the situation confronting Collins J 
involved a competent, terminally ill woman facing unbearable suffering. Permitting 
euthanasia in Ms Seales’ case would only open up the possibility to individuals in a 
similar position, which is a relatively small class. In Elizabeth Wicks’ opinion, restricting 
euthanasia to terminally ill patients is a “sensible solution” that is unlikely to endanger 
vulnerable people if guidelines are established and adhered to.106 The Court in Carter 
affirmed the trial judge’s factual finding that a “carefully designed and monitored system 
of safeguards” is capable of containing the inevitable risk of abuse towards the 
vulnerable.107 The Court’s ruling on this point is corroborated by evidence from 
jurisdictions where euthanasia is lawful, which offer a useful comparative perspective. 
According to the trial judge, these statistics reveal no disproportionate emphasis on 
“socially vulnerable populations.”108 
 
The Court also approved the trial judge’s ruling that physicians can ascertain their 
patients’ level of vulnerability by assessing their competence and decision-making 
abilities.109 The Court observed that individuals utilising legal methods of ending life, 
such as withdrawal of sustenance and palliative sedation, are similarly vulnerable, 
therefore there is no practical reason to treat those requesting euthanasia differently.110 
Given the similarities between the two jurisdictions, this reasoning should stand in New 
Zealand. The argument that regulation cannot protect vulnerable people can accordingly 
be classified as “a theoretical or speculative fear”111 that cannot validate criminalisation. 
Furthermore, people in Ms Seales’ position are also vulnerable and in need of legal 
protection. Prohibiting euthanasia forces these individuals to contemplate committing 
suicide in secret before they have reached the stage where their condition is unbearable.  
 
Another argument commonly raised in objection to allowing euthanasia is the difficulty 
of ascertaining whether a patient is competent to make a request. Terminally ill people 
often suffer from bouts of depression,112 and their decision-making abilities are likely to 
  
106 Elizabeth Wicks Human Rights and Healthcare (Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2007) at 270. 
107 At [117]. 
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be impaired while they process their situation. However, physicians assess patient 
competency for other major medical decisions without difficulty, so practically there is 
little difference in this instance. In Carter, the Court held physicians have the necessary 
training and experience to identify situations where patients are incompetent due to 
mental illness, or are being pressured into euthanasia.113 Similarly, the New Zealand 
medical profession could enforce the informed consent standard for euthanasia 
applications. Therefore, the correlation between depression and end of life requests does 
not amount to a strong argument against euthanasia. 
 
The ‘slippery slope’ justification is perhaps the belief most strongly held by euthanasia 
opponents. Simply put, this discourse posits that if terminally ill adults are permitted to 
access euthanasia, society and the law will become increasingly accepting of this practice 
in other situations until we reach a point that would previously have seemed unforgivable 
– involuntary euthanasia. Involuntary euthanasia occurs where a third party ends a 
competent patient’s life without obtaining consent or disregarding the patient’s refusal. 
At first blush this argument may appear laughable, but scholars have pointed to the 
Netherlands as an example of standards lowering over time in end of life practices. 
Although Dutch case law has permitted voluntary euthanasia in situations of mental 
illness and old age, empirical evidence shows no increasing propensity towards 
involuntary euthanasia. Euthanasia rates have remained stable over time, and no instances 
of involuntary euthanasia have been reported since legalisation.114 In 2010, 2.8% of 
deaths in the Netherlands resulted from euthanasia, which matches data obtained in 2001 
and 1995.115  
 
Belgium is also commonly cited regarding the ‘slippery slope.’ Studies suggest 
physicians face difficulties when determining the boundaries of acceptable euthanasia 
requests.116 Carter dismissed this reasoning because legalising euthanasia in Belgium 
merely established guidelines for a medical practice that had long been accepted in 
society, and as such Belgium has a “very different medico-legal culture.”117 Much like 
Canada, New Zealand has never permitted euthanasia and the medical profession has 
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traditionally opposed it,118 hence the same reasoning should apply. Carter and 
Stransham-Ford dismissed the ‘slippery slope’ argument due to a lack of substantive 
evidence.119 The Canadian Supreme Court were particularly emphatic, warning “we 
should not lightly assume that the regulatory regime will function defectively, nor should 
we assume that other criminal sanctions against the taking of lives will prove impotent 
against abuse.”120 These decisions provide convincing authority that the ‘slippery slope’ 
justification is not compelling. 
 
Another frequently argued justification for banning euthanasia is the availability and 
effectiveness of palliative care. Palliative care encompasses pain relief and emotional 
support for terminally ill patients.121 It aims neither to extend life nor end it.122 It is 
generally accepted that palliative care will not always satisfy the needs of dying 
patients.123 Drugs may fail to fully relieve pain and can cause distressing side effects, 
moreover in some circumstances they will be of little assistance, for example, patients 
with progressive muscle weakness diseases who gradually lose the ability to swallow and 
breathe.124 Ms Seales faced this difficulty, as her oncologist advised that palliative care 
would not substantially relieve her symptoms.125  
 
Opponents claim the quality of palliative care would decrease if euthanasia was legalised, 
because end of life care imposes a higher cost on the state. However, Harry Lesser argues 
that enabling those for whom palliative care is ineffective to access euthanasia should not 
prompt the majority of patients, who benefit from palliative care, to follow suit.126 
Furthermore, a higher quality of care has been observed in jurisdictions where euthanasia 
is lawful.127 A recent study examining euthanasia trends in the Netherlands before and 
after legalisation indicates physicians adhere strongly to the requirement that alternative 
options must be exhausted before resorting to euthanasia, and respond to euthanasia 
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requests by recommending palliative care.128 These results show that, far from being a 
replacement, euthanasia complements palliative care. The use of palliative care has also 
increased in Oregon, as demonstrated by studies showing significant increases in referrals 
to hospice specialists.129 Oregon implemented new policy systems for palliative care 
before the Death with Dignity Act was enacted.130 A similar approach could be taken in 
New Zealand to ensure the important role palliative care plays is not overshadowed by 
euthanasia. Regulation would enable the creation of a “palliative care filter”131 that 
ensures palliative care options are considered prior to deciding upon euthanasia.  
 
Studies also reveal that overwhelmingly in jurisdictions where euthanasia is legal, 
individuals choose to end their lives due to an inability to partake in activities that make 
life enjoyable, and a loss of autonomy and dignity.132 Unbearable pain, or fear of pain, 
only features in approximately one third of euthanasia cases.133 Generally those who seek 
euthanasia do so for reasons relating to their perceived quality of life, so individuals who 
currently find solace in palliative care are likely to continue to do so. These statistics 
further disprove the idea that palliative care would become obsolete if euthanasia was 
legalised in New Zealand. 
 
Proponents of legalisation argue euthanasia already occurs in countries where it is 
criminalised, therefore regulation protects the interests of those most susceptible to abuse 
through legal mechanisms. Lesser compares today’s culture of “back-street euthanasia” to 
abortion, whereby it was judged to be safer and more human rights friendly to allow 
trained physicians who are subject to medical standards and disciplinary bodies to end the 
lives of fetuses.134 A blanket ban on euthanasia increases the potential for abuse by 
forcing the activity underground and creating a covert system in which guidelines may be 
applied inconsistently. It is on this basis that Emily Jackson believes regulation is of 
greater benefit to vulnerable individuals than criminalisation.135 Furthermore, prohibiting 
euthanasia shuts down dialogue between the patient, their physician and their family. A 
forum for open communication about end of life possibilities empowers individuals to 
reach a decision that is right for them. In the New Zealand landscape, patients face 
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making this important choice on their own, for fear of exposing others to prosecution for 
assisted suicide.  
 
A terminally ill person who believes their quality of life is deteriorating may take great 
comfort in knowing they have the ability to determine when and how they will die. This 
is a persuasive argument for legalisation because the alternative involves “condemning 
some people to very grave suffering” on the unsubstantiated assumption that regulation 
cannot adequately support the vulnerable.136 An oncologist who submitted to the 
Canadian Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide likened this reassurance 
of control to a life jacket on an airplane – rarely used in reality, nonetheless a crucial 
means of placating people’s nerves and boosting their confidence.137 This analogy is 
consistent with evidence from Oregon, which shows that one in 50 terminal patients 
discuss euthanasia with their physician, and one in 6 talk about it with their family, 
however only one in 800 undergo euthanasia.138 It appears many individuals 
contemplating euthanasia do not opt to go through with it. For the majority, what is 
significant is the ability to choose death when life becomes unbearable. In Seales, doctors 
who had practiced in Oregon, New Mexico and Montana gave evidence stating their 
patients generally died of natural causes, but valued having control over the process of 
their death.139 Their conclusion is reflected in Ms Seales’ affidavit, in which she states:140  
 
As my death has become more inevitable, I constantly worry that it could be slow, 
unpleasant, painful and undignified. I worry that I will be forced to experience a 
death that is in no way consistent with the person that I am and the way that I have 
lived my life. I know that it might not turn out this way, but even the chance that it 
will is weighing on me very heavily. 
 
This paper asserts that s 179(b) impairs the right to life more than reasonably necessary 
for the protection of vulnerable individuals. The Hansen s 5 minimal impairment section 
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The final limb of the s 5 Hansen analysis asks whether the restriction on the right is in 
proportion with the gravity of its purpose. The evidence discussed above does not suggest 
vulnerable individuals face an increased risk of harm under a well-regulated system. It is 
for this reason that the limitation is not proportionate to its purpose.141 
 
This paper has resolved the s 5 analysis in favour of the limitation being unjustified. The 
purpose of s 179(b), protecting vulnerable individuals, is meritorious and does warrant 
curtailment of the right to life, however criminalising assisted euthanasia impairs the right 
disproportionately and more than reasonably necessary to fulfill this aim. 
D Alternative meaning 
Parliament’s wide construction of suicide imposes an unjustified limitation on Ms Seales’ 
right to life. The final stage of the Hansen test requires a rights friendly meaning to be 
read into the legislative phrase in question if reasonably possible. If such an interpretation 
of suicide is not tenable, Parliament’s intended meaning must prevail. 
 
It is worth noting any discussion of the meaning of suicide will inevitably be coloured by 
the emotion and stigma surrounding the act. Taking one’s own life has been viewed in 
contradictory ways across a variety of cultures and time periods. Popular conceptions of 
suicide have both condemned and condoned the practice. Prevailing attitudes throughout 
modern history have tended towards a social aversion to suicide, indeed killing oneself 
remained a criminal offence in most countries until relatively recently.  
 
Ms Seales submitted that Collins J should adopt a narrower definition of suicide that 
excludes rational decisions to die made by competent, terminally ill adults.142 Her 
preferred interpretation distinguishes between rational, self-determined death and death 
brought about by impaired thinking. Such a conception of suicide has not found favour 
with the courts, but has gained some support amongst the mental health profession143 and 
academics.144 Sheila McLean describes suicide as a “private act,” differentiating 
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euthanasia as a “social act” that depends upon the assistance of another.145 According to 
David Lanham, suicide requires both a desire to die and “contempt for one’s own life.”146 
People in Ms Seales’ position lack this disregard for life; rather their choice to die 
upholds the dignity with which they have lived their lives.147 While they would prefer to 
live, they choose death over their present quality of life. The absence of contempt 
amongst rational, terminally ill patients seeking euthanasia leads Lanham to conclude 
these individuals do not fit the definition of suicide.148 Furthermore, he stresses the 
importance of defining suicide narrowly to uphold individuals’ rights to autonomy and 
dignity.149 Interpreting suicide in this way focuses not on the outcome of self-inflicted 
death but on the soundness of the reasoning behind the decision. 
 
In Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v All Means All, Panckhurst J held 
that a prisoner carrying out a hunger strike was not attempting suicide.150 The individual 
was fasting as a form of protest, which the Judge held did not amount to suicide, where 
“death is the desired and intended result.”151 Although a fasting prisoner is in a different 
position to a terminally ill patient seeking euthanasia, the reasoning applied in All Means 
All corresponds well with a narrow meaning of suicide. A terminally ill individual does 
not desire death, but rather wishes to avoid unbearable suffering in circumstances where 
their death is imminent. Their intention is to control the circumstances of their death, 
rather than to die. Ms Seales emphasises this in her affidavit, which Collins J quotes at 
length:152  
 
I am not depressed. I have accepted my terminal illness and manage it in hugely 
good spirits considering that it’s robbing me of a full life. I can deal with that, and 
deal with the fact that I am going to die, but I can’t deal with the thought that I may 
have to suffer in a way that is unbearable and mortifying for me. 
 
The definition of suicide was also questioned in Compassion in Dying v State of 
Washington, in which the Federal Court of Appeal ruled the prohibition of physician-
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assisted euthanasia unconstitutional.153 Although this decision was subsequently 
overruled, the United States Supreme Court did not engage with the lower court’s 
discussion of the meaning of suicide. Compassion in Dying is significant because the 
Court was willing to accept the proposition that euthanasia falls outside the scope of 
suicide. The majority saw no substantial difference between active voluntary euthanasia 
and patient death via termination of life support or withdrawal of sustenance. Since the 
latter categories are not deemed to constitute suicide, the majority doubted the credibility 
of classifying physician-assisted euthanasia as such.154 The majority also observed that 
active voluntary euthanasia merely “hasten[s] by medical means a death that is already in 
process,” and therefore does not meet the definition of suicide.155 The All Means All and 
Compassion in Dying decisions strengthen Ms Seales’ assertion that suicide should bear a 
narrow meaning. 
 
In Seales, Collins J discusses the meaning of suicide early in his judgment, admittedly in 
the context of Parliament’s intent. His Honour rejects the contention that active voluntary 
euthanasia is similar to passive voluntary euthanasia, which the law does not consider to 
amount to suicide.156 His Honour provides little analysis on this point, and fails to address 
the fact that both involve a rational decision to die. Collins J also engages in an 
interpretative exercise based upon the CA provisions dealing with suicide. In New 
Zealand, committing suicide was decriminalised in 1893 with the passing of the Criminal 
Code Act, and attempting suicide followed suit in 1961 under the CA.157 These changes 
reflect a social shift towards viewing suicide as a mental health issue that should not be 
approached with criminal sanctions but with rehabilitative measures such as counselling. 
The decriminalisation of suicide should not be read as implying a right to kill oneself, but 
merely the recognition that suicidal individuals are vulnerable and require protection and 
assistance.158 Assisted suicide has remained an offence under s 179(b), and in 1961 
Parliament amended s 41 and enacted s 180.159 
 
Although Collins J framed the purpose of s 179(b) broadly, the author endorses the 
narrower aim of protecting the vulnerable, as discussed above. Terminally ill, rational 
adults such as Ms Seales, Mr Stransham-Ford, Mrs Pretty and Ms Taylor do not define 
  
153 Compassion in Dying v State of Washington 79 F 3d 790 (9th Cir 1996) at 798. 
154 At 824. 
155 At 824. 
156 At [143]. 
157 Seales, above n 2, at [118]. 
158 Seales, above n 2, at [129]. 
159 Seales, above n 2, at [119]–[122]. 
28  
 
themselves as vulnerable and it is hard to see how they could be viewed as such.160 These 
individuals have approached their fatal medical conditions with maturity and dignity, and 
they have sought death after careful consideration of their circumstances. They are 
distinguishable from those who contemplate suicide as a result of depression and other 
mental health issues, who most would agree are vulnerable and in need of the state’s 
protection. Collins J accepts there are different forms of self-inflicted death – voluntarily 
taking one’s life, sacrificing one’s life, and being forced to take one’s life.161 His Honour 
asserts that only the first category will amount to suicide.162 Conceptually, however, it is 
individuals within the third category who are vulnerable because their mental state is such 
that they feel pressured to take their lives. Section 179(b) aims to protect this social 
group, therefore rational, terminally ill patients such as Ms Seales should fall outside the 
ambit of s 179(b). It is thus more consistent with the purpose of s 179(b) to interpret 
suicide narrowly. 
 
Collins J asserts that suicide must be all-encompassing because s 41 would not make 
sense if it only applied to certain types of self-inflicted death.163 Tucker and Geddis 
convincingly argue that a narrow interpretation of suicide in reality makes more sense in 
the context of s 41.164 Euthanasia would most likely occur in a hospital or private home, 
and neither environment provides sufficient opportunity for members of the public to 
intervene. Section 41 is better suited to situations involving irrational suicide, for 
example, tackling an individual to prevent them jumping off a bridge, or assaulting 
someone to remove a weapon from their person. It is unlikely members of the public will 
‘stumble upon’ the execution of a euthanasia request, therefore his Honour’s argument 
that s 41 requires a wide definition of suicide is a weak one. A narrow interpretation of 
suicide is also more consistent with the purpose of s 180, to protect vulnerable individuals 
who form a suicide pact and may be pressured into ending their lives. Situations of this 
nature are associated with irrational suicides and would be unlikely to occur in respect of 
terminally ill, rational adults who decide to undergo euthanasia. Furthermore, if two such 
individuals did decide to seek euthanasia together and one survived, criminal liability 
would arguably be inappropriate.165 Defining suicide narrowly better facilitates the 
operation of the CA provisions that cover matters associated with ending one’s life. 
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Ms Seales’ proposed definition of suicide may seem strained and at odds with how the 
word is ordinarily used. However, the interpretation only relates to the meaning of suicide 
in the CA and does not need to sit comfortably alongside the connotations of suicide in 
other contexts. It is also unclear whether contemporary New Zealand society has a 
common understanding of the meaning of suicide, given attitudes have changed 
significantly since 1961. The courts tend to be more willing to accept strained meanings 
where the rights being infringed are fundamental, so taking suicide to mean the irrational 
ending of one’s life is plausible.  
 
In the past, New Zealand courts have striven to alleviate human rights concerns by giving 
legislative phrases a contemporaneous meaning. In Re Application by AMM and KJO to 
adopt a child, Wild and Simon France JJ extended the meaning of spouse under the 
Adoption Act 1955 to include heterosexual de facto couples.166 Parliament’s intention 
was clearly to allow only married couples to make joint adoption applications.167 
Nevertheless, the Court held that such an interpretation upheld the underlying purpose of 
the Act by preserving the traditional concept of the family unit.168 Wild and Simon 
France JJ were willing to tolerate “some resulting awkwardness in language” because the 
BORA was passed decades after the Adoption Act.169 Seales presented a similar situation, 
as New Zealand’s current CA was enacted in 1961 and dates back to the late 19th 
century. Parliament would not have legislated with the BORA in mind; hence a more 
strained and difficult interpretation may be possible under s 6. It was therefore feasible 
for Collins J to exclude rational, terminally ill adults seeking euthanasia from the 
definition of suicide. His Honour noted that the CA may require an interpretation that 
contradicts Parliament’s intention at the time of enactment,170 but the issue did not need 
to be examined further due to his Honour’s finding of consistency. 
 
If Collins J had endorsed this alternative meaning, physician-assisted euthanasia would 
have become lawful in New Zealand. Legalising euthanasia is a step many, including the 
author, believe should most properly be left to Parliament. When Seales was being 
decided, no legislative action was imminent. Several Bills have come before the House, 
and all have been voted down or withdrawn from the ballot. Collins J afforded Parliament 
an excessive amount of deference in respect of Ms Seales’ claim. Interpreting a statutory 
  
166 Re Application by AMM and KJO to adopt a child [2010] NZFLR 629 (HC) at [73]. 
167 AMM and KJO, above n 166, at [16]–[17]. 
168 At [35]–[37]. 
169 At [31]. 
170 Seales, above n 2, at [88]. 
30  
 
provision in a human rights friendly way is a responsibility the legislature has designated 
to New Zealand courts under the BORA. Allowing physician-assisted euthanasia as a 
lawful activity was therefore a viable option. Legalising euthanasia would likely have 
prompted clarification from Parliament, presumably the enactment of a statute regulating 
euthanasia or the amendment of s 179(b) to expressly include rational, terminally ill 
adults seeking euthanasia.  
 
A second, less radical, option would have been to deem the narrow meaning of suicide 
untenable and grant a declaration of inconsistency. Doing so would have acknowledged 
the unjustified infringement on Ms Seales’ right to life, but would not have enabled her to 
avail herself of assisted euthanasia due to the operation of s 4. That this avenue was 
available to the Court was confirmed a month later by Heath J in Taylor v Attorney-
General.171 A declaration of inconsistency would not have forced Parliament to take 
action, but would have amounted to a strong push from the High Court and would at least 
have provoked Parliament to consider the matter.  
 
In his discussion of assisted euthanasia cases, TRS Allan urges the judiciary to read 
statutes creatively because this produces important dialogue between the courts and 
Parliament, which will in turn “generate a wider public discussion.”172 It is regrettable 
that Collins J did not reach this stage in his analysis, which rendered the case less 
influential than it might have been. Irrespective of the result, the widespread publicity of 














171 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706 at [77] and [79]. 
172 TRS Allan The Sovereignty of Law: freedom, constitution, and common law (Oxford University Press, 





Whether physician-assisted euthanasia should be lawful is a complex issue. The topic 
invites a range of perspectives – morality, politics, religion, culture and philosophy have 
all shaped the development of legislation, case law and academic discussion of what the 
law should be. There is something inherent in the nature of death and dying that provokes 
a strong response from humankind, whether in favour of euthanasia or against it. Ronald 
Dworkin best encapsulates this sensitivity, noting:173 
 
Death is special, a peculiarly significant event in the narrative of our lives, like the 
final scene of a play, with everything about it intensified, under a special spotlight … 
how we die matters because it is how we die. 
 
It is fitting, then, that this paper should end by asking what lies ahead. From a legal 
standpoint, the Seales case did not challenge the boundaries of human rights law in New 
Zealand. Collins J approached the matter conservatively, and should have employed a 
measure of judicial creativity to reach the point at which a declaration of inconsistency 
was possible, and perhaps even to interpret s 179(b) as Ms Seales wished. 
 
The true legacy of the Seales case is the debate and emotion Ms Seales’ claim has 
generated within New Zealand society. The ultimate outcome of Seales is now in the 
hands of Parliament, and, by virtue of democracy, the public. It is the author’s opinion 
that any amendment or clarification of the law relating to assisted euthanasia should now 
come from the legislature. It is likely euthanasia will become a reality for New 
Zealanders; statistics suggest a majority of the country would support such a change.174 
Whether or not law reform eventuates, this case will be remembered as a significant 
moment in New Zealand history, and Ms Seales’ courage in pursuing justice for herself 









173 Dworkin, above n 39, at 209. 
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